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Evidence
Carlos E. Lazarus*
During the past term only two cases arose in which im-
portant points on the law of evidence were involved. These are
being noted elsewhere in this issue' and are not discussed
here. Other cases concerning matters of evidence, on the whole,
merely reiterated well-established principles recognized by the
Louisiana jurisprudence.
The need for interposing proper defensive pleas in criminal
actions to support the introduction of exonerative evidence was
emphasized in two decisions. In State v. Knight2 the court ruled
that testimony regarding previous threats against the accused by
the victim of the homicide is inadmissible in the absence of a
plea of self defense. This is in accord with generally accepted
principles: Communicated threats which are declarations of the
victims may be proved to show that the accused was in a reason-
able state of apprehension and consequently testimony concern-
ing them is relevant for the purpose of showing that the accused
acted in self defense. It follows, therefore, that unless a plea of
self defense has been filed, such testimony should be excluded.8
In a like vein, since evidence as to the mental condition of
the accused in a criminal prosecution is not admissible in the
absence of a plea of insanity, it was held in State v. Boone4 that
no error had been committed by the trial court in refusing to
permit defense counsel to read from a hospital record contain-
ing reports concerning the mental condition of the accused for
the benefit of the jury.
In State v. Biegert5 the admission in evidence of defendant's
confession as to the illegal practice of medicine and of statements
made by him regarding the manner in which he obtained nar-
cotic drugs for dispensation to his "patients" was held relevant
and proper in a prosecution for the illegal possession of narcotics.
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1. In re Kohn, 227 La. 245, 79 So.2d 81 (1955), 16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw
440 (1956), State v. Dominguez, 82 So.2d 12 (1955), 16 LOuISIANA LAW REVIEW
434 (1956).
2. 227 La. 739, 80 So.2d 391 (1955).
3. In this connection see WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 105 et seq. (3d ed. 1940).
4. 227 La. 850, 80 So.2d 710 (1955).
5. 227 La. 1100, 81 So.2d 410 (1955).
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These facts, the court said, tended to establish that the drugs
had been secured through fraud and deceit, disclosing not only
that he had obtained them unlawfully, but also with guilty knowl-
edge.
In State v. Jackson6 defendant's counsel sought to show by
cross examination of an accomplice who had testified for the
state that the witness had made prior contradictory statements
and that he was prejudiced against the accused. The objection
by the state to this line of questioning was sustained by the trial
court. In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held it
was well settled that, when the prosecution in a criminal case
relies on the testimony of an accomplice to prove its case, great
latitude must be allowed the defendant in cross examination of
the witness. Furthermore, under articles 492 and 493 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, the defense was clearly entitled to
show bias and to lay the foundation for the introduction and
proof of prior inconsistent statements.
Although recognizing the right of the accused to take the
stand for the limited purpose of traversing testimony regard-
ing the voluntariness of his confession, the Supreme Court in
State v. Johnson7 held that no prejudicial error is committed by
the refusal of the judge to permit the accused to exercise this
right when no part of the confession has been offered in evi-
dence nor read to the jury in the opening statement.
In State v. Carter" the court restates the established juris-
prudence that an accused relying on self defense does not have
the burden of proving that the killing was justifiable, but that it
is upon the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
homicide was committed with felonious intent and therefore, not
in self defense. The refusal of the trial judge to so charge the
jury was held to be reversible error.
6. 227 La. 949, 81 So.2d 5 (1955).
7. 226 La. 30, 74 So.2d 402 (1954).
8. 227 La. 820, 80 So.2d 420 (1955).
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